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CREATING LAW AT THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: THE
LAWYER AS PROSECUTOR
ROBERTA S. KARMEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) en-
gages in a wide range of regulatory activities, and its mix of administrative func-
tions has changed over the years.  At one time it was busily engaged in disman-
tling public utility holding companies and participating in bankruptcy
reorganizations,1 and today it devotes considerable resources to oversight of se-
curities self-regulatory organizations and implementation of the national mar-
ket system.2  Since its creation in 1934, an important function of the SEC has
been processing registration statements and other disclosure documents by
public issuers.3
Nevertheless, the SEC’s public reputation rests largely on its work as a
prosecutorial agency—the policeman of Wall Street.  It has a vast and varied
arsenal of prosecutorial weapons in proceedings before the agency,4 and it can
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1. The Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79z-6
(1994)), was passed in 1935.  Although the SEC’s work in dismantling public utility holding companies
was completed years ago, it continues to administer this statute despite repeated suggestions that its
administration be passed on to the former Federal Power Commission or that the statute be repealed,
an example of the persistence of regulation long after the need for a particular regulatory scheme has
passed.  See I LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 241-42 n.38 (1989).
2. The task of facilitating the national market system was given to the SEC in 1975 through
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  See Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975); see also
Norman S. Poser, A Critical Look at the SEC’s National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883 (1981).
3. Initially, the SEC’s authority was confined to processing disclosure documents by companies
engaged in public offerings and to reviewing the annual and periodic disclosure documents of listed
issuers.  In 1964, the SEC was given authority with respect to the annual and periodic disclosures of all
public companies.  See Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 556 (1964).
4. For example, under the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC can stop order registration statements
and issue cease-and-desist orders, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(d)(3), 77h-1 (1994), and under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, it can suspend or revoke the registration of broker-dealers and their associates,
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bring injunctive actions that can include ancillary relief in the federal courts.5
Furthermore, violations of the securities laws are both civil and criminal.  Ac-
cordingly, when judges interpret novel cases under the securities laws, the out-
come may differ depending upon whether the judge invokes the doctrine that
the securities laws are broad remedial statutes that should be liberally inter-
preted or are criminal statutes that should be strictly construed.6
Frequently, the SEC makes new law through enforcement cases rather than
through rulemaking.  Sometimes this effort at creating new law is blessed by
the courts, as recently occurred with the SEC’s misappropriation theory for the
crime of insider trading.7  Sometimes the SEC makes new law through en-
forcement cases and then this extension of its authority is incorporated by Con-
gress in statutory amendments to the securities laws, as happened after the
SEC’s sensitive payments enforcement cases, which resulted in the enactment
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.8  At other times, SEC creativity at ex-
tending the securities laws is rejected and disregarded.9
This essay will discuss the role of the SEC prosecutor in the context of the
ethical obligations of a government lawyer when expanding the SEC’s authority
through the development of new legal theories.  If the obligation of a govern-
ment prosecutor is not simply zealous representation of a client, but also the
obligation to seek justice, is it appropriate to use enforcement cases as policy
instruments to achieve new legal standards?  How does a government lawyer
acting as a prosecutor in a novel case balance obligations to the public at large
against fair treatment of an individual defendant?  It is easier to pose these
                                                          
compel issuers and others to correct filings, issue cease-and-desist orders, issue fines, and suspend
trading in securities, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(k), 78o(b)(4) - (6), 78o(c)(4), 78u-2, 78u-3 (1994).
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1994).  There are similar provisions in other statutes adminis-
tered by the SEC.  See generally George Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in
Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983).
6. See United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The courts
have focused on the problems of dual civil and criminal violations in double jeopardy claim cases, and
the Supreme Court has recently concluded that an administrative sanction imposed by federal banking
regulators posed no double jeopardy bar to a later criminal prosecution.  See Hudson v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).  The Court considered the sanctions, and also the civil goal of deterrence and the
criminal goal of punishment, and concluded that the civil sanctions were not criminal punishments.
Courts have sometimes used the doctrine of lenity to interpret a statute narrowly in a civil case be-
cause the statute also has criminal sanctions.  See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,
504 U.S. 505, 518-19 (1992); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990).  But courts have not
squarely confronted the problem that, if the securities laws are liberally interpreted in civil cases,
criminal acts are thus defined.
7. See O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.  In fact, insider trading is not defined in the securities laws
and is itself an excellent example of law creation by the SEC, accomplished through an administrative
broker-dealer disciplinary proceeding, see Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and through an
SEC injunctive action, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. See Report of the SEC on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices to the
Senate Comm. on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., (1976) (the backdrop to Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), which added §§
13(b)(2), 30A and 32 to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-
1, 78dd-2, and 78ff (1994)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977).
9. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (rebuffing SEC’s at-
tempt to extend the definition of “security” to include pension rights); see also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103 (1978).
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questions than to answer them, especially in a field like securities law where the
public interest is defined in terms of investor confidence in the public securities
markets—an amorphous goal—and defendants are frequently big businesses or
individuals who are flamboyant confidence men.  It is easy for populists to be-
lieve in the righteousness of their cause in chasing white collar criminals.  It is
more difficult to decline to prosecute those who have engaged in questionable
conduct because such conduct does not breach any clear legal standard in a
complex statutory scheme where many standards are unclear.
This essay will also discuss the tensions between the enforcement staff and
the SEC Commissioners with respect to this process of law creation.  Although
the SEC enforcement attorney does not represent his own view of the public
interest, but rather the agency as an entity, if there are conflicting viewpoints
among agency commissioners, to whom does the enforcement attorney listen
for guidance?  Should the Commission take a different view of the law when it
is acting in an executive role in instituting a case than when it is acting in a judi-
cial role in deciding an administrative proceeding?  Since most cases are set-
tled, at what juncture should prosecutorial discretion be exercised, and by
whom—the staff or the Commission?
The articulation of new standards is a difficult business, especially in a dy-
namic and fast paced area like securities regulation.  The government is always
in a reactive mode, lagging behind developments in the marketplace.  The case-
by-case development of the law of fraud, overreaching, or similar conduct is in-
volved is not necessarily bad, but I have always been troubled by the utilization
of novel theories in criminal prosecutions and many SEC civil enforcement
cases where the consequences are serious to the individual defendants.  An
agency that operates this way needs very good judgment and prosecutorial re-
straint to maintain its credibility as a regulator.  The government prosecutor
must therefore be attentive not only to the agency’s and the public’s best long
term interests, but also to current political and judicial trends.  Government
prosecutors are public servants.  In my view, persons under investigation and
defendants in government prosecution are among the members of the public
served.
II
THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER’S CLIENT
“When a lawyer is employed by or retained to represent an organization,
the lawyer represents the interests of the organization as defined by its respon-
sible agents acting pursuant to the organization’s decisionmaking procedures.”10
In day-to-day matters, this means a lawyer generally takes instructions from an
organization’s managers.  In the corporate context, there has been considerable
                                                          
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155(1)(a) (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997) [hereinafter “RESTATEMENT”].  The ABA Model Rules uses a slightly different phrasing:
“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
organized constituents.”  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1992).
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debate about the role of the lawyer when a corporation is violating the law.
Much of this debate was sparked by SEC cases that suggested the corporate
lawyer should be a whistleblower, owing a duty either to shareholders or to the
marketplace.11  This debate was resolved by acceptance of the principle that
when a lawyer represents a corporation that is acting illegally, the lawyer must
bring the matter to the attention of the corporation’s board of directors, and if
the directors do not rectify the situation, the lawyer must resign.12  Neverthe-
less, in some situations, courts have suggested that a corporate lawyer repre-
sents the shareholders, not the corporate officers.13
Similar debates have focused on the government lawyer.  Does the govern-
ment lawyer represent the agency or the public interest?  According to the Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the government lawyer represents the
agency that employs him.14  An agency lawyer also serves the interests of com-
missioners who have decisionmaking authority, and his responsibilities are de-
termined through a chain of command that relieves him of the duty to assess
the public interest personally.15
Representation of the government client differs from representation of a
private sector client in three principle respects.  First, the goals of a governmen-
tal client necessarily include pursuit of the public interest.16  Second, both gov-
ernment lawyers and those who direct their activities are often subject to
greater legal constraints.17  Third, and conversely, a government lawyer may
possess powers beyond those possessed by a corporate lawyer, such as the
power to select those persons who will be charged with crimes or prosecuted in
civil actions for illegal behavior.18  As a practical matter, a government prosecu-
tor has a certain amount of autonomy in investigating and prosecuting cases.
The SEC prosecutor also has the tools to marshal public opinion in favor of its
choice of prosecutions through dealings with the Congress and the press.
Good arguments have been made about why the government lawyer cannot
determine the public interest without regard to an agency’s hierarchical deci-
sionmaking process.  The agency client must believe that the lawyer will repre-
sent the legitimate interests the agency seeks to advance, and not be influenced
                                                          
11. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972).  Although the SEC prevailed in obtaining a judgment, the appeals
court rejected its theory that attorneys should be whistleblowers for the government.  See SEC v. Na-
tional Student Mktg. Corp., 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1992); Simon M. Lorne & W.
Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 BUS. LAW. 1293 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
14. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at §§ 155, 156.
15. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice:
Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 42
(1990).
16. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 156 cmt. b.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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by some unique and personal vision of the public interest.19  The agency ap-
proach permits the agency to rely on the governmental lawyer.20  Further, nei-
ther the Constitution nor the electorate has invested the government attorney
with independence to determine what policies are enlightened or to advance
the cause of justice or further his individual public policy agenda.21
Although a government lawyer must follow the instructions of his superiors
with respect to scope and implementation of the representation, he is supposed
to advance the public interest, not merely the partisan or personal interest of
the agency.22  Also, a prosecutor must protect the rights of the innocent and the
guilty.23  In criminal cases, this is interpreted as meaning prosecutors must bring
charges only if based on probable cause.24  While it would seem to follow that
such a standard should apply to serious civil prosecutions such as SEC cases,
there is no case authority on point.25  The courts sometimes have rejected ar-
guments that the severe consequences of SEC prosecutions should make them
subject to principles utilized in criminal cases by invoking the doctrine that the
securities laws are remedial statutes.26  But since a violation of the securities
laws is both civil and criminal, it would seem that prosecutorial discretion
should be similarly restrained.
I experienced the conflicts between an enforcement attorney’s own view of
the public interest in the development of cases and an agency’s more general
and sometimes contrary view on two different tours of duty at the SEC.  From
1962 until 1969, I served as an enforcement attorney, then branch chief, and
then assistant regional administrator in the SEC’s New York Regional Office.
From 1977 until 1980, I was a Commissioner of the SEC.  In analyzing the ethi-
cal obligations of an SEC prosecutor, it is important to understand that the
SEC frequently articulates new policies and develops the law through cases.
What kind of probable cause standard applies to such a situation?  If a new le-
gal standard is untested, must the prosecutor believe that the Supreme Court
will accept this doctrine, or must the prosecutor only believe that a proposed
defendant engaged in conduct that ought to be illegal?  Or is it sufficient to be-
lieve that the defendant will settle the case?
                                                          
19. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 298 (1991).
20. See Report by the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee of Government Lawyers and the
Model Rules on Professional Conduct, reprinted in WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 53.
21. See Bruce E. Fein, Promoting the President’s Policies Through Legal Advocacy: An Ethical
Imperative of the Government Attorney, 30 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 406, 408 (1983).  But see Charles
Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. BAR J. 331, 332 (1974)
(arguing that a government lawyer’s client is “the people as a whole”).
22. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 156 cmt. f.
23. See id. at cmt. h.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (ruling that burden of proof in disciplinary cases is
preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence).  But see Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d
484 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sanction in administrative proceeding a “penalty” for purposes of statute of limi-
tations).
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III
CASE PROCESSING AT THE SEC
The SEC is an independent federal agency organized as a commission.
There are five commissioners, one of whom is designated as Chairman.  The
SEC has always valued its independence, and as a prosecutorial agency, inde-
pendence is an important feature of the agency’s culture.  The SEC is feared,
on both Wall and Main Streets and on Capitol Hill, because of its power to
generate adverse publicity and its key role in the capital raising process.27  Con-
gress and the President have generally been wary of interfering with the SEC’s
prosecutorial functions, although occasional lapses in this hands-off attitude
have occurred.28  The SEC represents itself in the lower courts, although the
authority for so doing is somewhat unclear, but Congress declined to give the
SEC authority to represent itself before the Supreme Court.29  Early chairmen
of the SEC recognized that in order to maintain the SEC’s independence and
integrity, the agency would need to stay out of politics and prevail in its cases.
Great care was taken not to institute cases the SEC was not certain it would
win.30
While the securities bar or the securities industry sometimes may complain
that the Enforcement Division is “out of control,” and investigations may
sometimes range beyond the Commission’s supervision, cases cannot be insti-
tuted or settled without the Commission’s approval.  A formal order of investi-
gation from the SEC is needed for the Enforcement Division to take testimony
under oath and subpoena records.  A Commission order is also necessary for
any civil action to be commenced in a federal court or before the Commission
itself.  The Commission also passes on settlement offers.
Nevertheless, the enforcement staff generally shapes the Commission’s
policies and develops new law through the cases it selects to pursue and the
theories it utilizes in prosecuting them.  This dynamic seems out of joint since it
is the Commissioners who are selected by the President and confirmed by the
Senate and invested with policy making functions.  An analogy to the func-
tioning of large public corporations is perhaps apt.  Directors no longer actively
manage corporations on a day-to-day basis; they monitor management.31  This
analogy cannot be pushed too far, however.  Unlike directors, SEC Commis-
sioners work full time and are generally more proactive.
                                                          
27. A high ranking SEC enforcement official once told me he had no interest in leaving the Com-
mission despite the financial rewards available in the private sector because “now, every CEO in
America will take my phone call.”
28. See infra text accompanying note 33; see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648
F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
29. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 290 (1994).
30. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 126 (1982).
31. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01
cmt. a (1994).
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In any event, the Commission’s obligation to approve various stages of a
case creates a certain tension between the Commission and the Enforcement
Division.  When I was an enforcement attorney, I thought obtaining a Commis-
sion order before I could go to court was a nuisance, a waste of valuable time
before I could get an injunction to stop a scam or close down a broker-dealer
with inadequate capital.  I was led to believe that promotion within the agency
turned on the development and successful prosecution of attention-grabbing
cases.  When I encountered problems persuading the Commission to institute a
factually complex case based on a novel legal theory, I thought the Commis-
sioners did not have proper political will.  It did not occur to me that perhaps
they questioned the policy implications of the case.  When I was a Commis-
sioner, however, I felt the enforcement staff was insufficiently respectful of my
views on law and policy and too inclined to substitute their view of the public
interest for the Commission’s best interests.
To some extent, such a tension is healthy.  The Commission prides itself on
the give and take between the Commissioners and the staff.  The Commission
meeting room evidences this approach.  It is not furnished like a courtroom
with judges sitting above everyone else.  Rather, the Commissioners and staff
meet and discuss cases at a round table.  Although lawyers in the United States
are accustomed to working things out in an adversarial way, a third party—the
hapless target of an SEC investigation or prosecution—who is not present or
represented might well complain of unfairness in becoming the object of a
struggle over enforcement policy.
During the time I was a Commissioner, policy creation was not entirely
within the agency’s control because of political changes outside the SEC.  From
its formation in 1934 until the mid-1970s, the SEC had a stellar record in the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts, especially the Second Circuit, not only in
cases where the SEC or the United States was the plaintiff, but also in cases
where the SEC participated as amicus curiae.  This was also a period of con-
tinuous expansion of the securities laws, through court interpretations of the
statutes and their amendment by Congress.  Then, in 1975, the Court began to
cut back on the jurisdictional reach of the federal securities laws through re-
strictive interpretations of substantive provisions, particularly the general anti-
fraud provisions.32  This change in the judiciary’s attitude was a harbinger of a
far reaching political shift toward deregulation and less government at the fed-
eral level.
This change was wrenching for the Commission and its staff.  The questions
about the role and loyalties of the government prosecutor that are addressed
here arose frequently while I was a Commissioner during the late 1970s.  The
context of prosecutorial decisionmaking was markedly different from the 1960s
                                                          
32. This trend began with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).  The Sec-
ond Circuit, like the SEC, resisted the Court’s efforts to cut back on the scope of the statutes, particu-
larly in anti-fraud cases.  See Roberta S. Karmel & John P. Ketels, Securities Commentary, 44 BROOK.
L. REV. 1189 (1978).
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when I was an SEC enforcement attorney in the Commission’s regional office
in New York.  An intervening watershed event was Watergate, which led to
suspicion of government and to statutory regulation of the regulators.  Water-
gate had a perverse effect on the SEC, however, because of President Nixon’s
efforts to tamper with the SEC’s investigation of Robert Vesco, which em-
broiled the agency in rare and agonizing scandal.33  During the post-Watergate
years the SEC restored its reputation for integrity by investigating and prose-
cuting corporate violations of campaign finance laws.34
Although the world was changing during the Carter years, the SEC staff was
resistant to such change, believing that any efforts to dampen its prosecutorial
zeal were somehow corrupt and, in any event, contrary to the public interest.
The Commission itself was divided.  Two Commissioners were long-time staff
members: Philip A. Loomis, Jr., a former General Counsel, and Irving M. Pol-
lack, a former enforcement director.  A third Commissioner, John R. Evans,
had been a staffer on Capitol Hill.  All three had been with the SEC during the
Watergate scandal involving G. Bradford Cook,35 which made them protective
of the Enforcement Division and suspicious of business interests.  The Chair-
man, Harold M. Williams, came from the business and academic worlds.  I was
the fifth and youngest member, and the first woman, and after leaving the SEC
staff, I had been engaged in private practice, primarily representing firms in the
securities industry.  Many enforcement attorneys on the staff had been my
friends and my mentors when I was a staffer, and they assumed I would return
to the Commission as the vigorous prosecutor I had been when I was younger.
However, my views had been seasoned by representing the regulated.  I also
had been affected by Watergate, but this crisis left me with a deep suspicion of
government rather than a suspicion of Wall Street and big business.
In addition to the Watergate scandals, the outlook and activities of the SEC
as a prosecutor had also been shaped by the SEC’s organization and the forma-
tion of the Enforcement Division under Chairman William J. Casey in 1972.
Before 1972, the Enforcement Division had been combined with what is now
the Division of Market Regulation as the Division of Trading and Markets.  It
therefore had both regulatory and enforcement functions and responsibilities, a
combination of functions that, in my experience, tends to temper prosecutorial
zeal.  Casey’s vision was that the SEC’s enforcement capabilities would become
                                                          
33. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 446-48.  In November 1972, the SEC filed a complaint against
Vesco, charging him with looting $224 million from four mutual funds managed by Investors Overseas
Services, an offshore investment adviser that had been in regulatory difficulty for many years.  In May
1973, a federal grand jury charged that Maurice Stans, a former Secretary of Commerce and chief
campaign fund raiser for President Nixon, had pressured G. Bradford Cook, who became Chairman of
the SEC when William J. Casey resigned, to delete from the SEC’s complaint against Vesco mention
of a $250,000 cash delivery.  This effort succeeded.  As events unfolded, it was revealed that $200,000
of this money was secretly given by Vesco to President Nixon’s re-election campaign.  See Jurek Mar-
tin & Pascal Fletcher, Fugitive Financier in Cuban Detention, FIN. TIMES (London), June 10, 1995, at 3.
34. See SELIGMAN, supra, note 30, at 539-44.
35. See id. at 441-42, 445-46.  Chairman Cook was forced to resign because of discrepancies in his
testimony about the Vesco case.  See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 232 N.W. 2d 120
(Neb. 1975).
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more professional and more subordinate to its policymaking activities.  A cynic
might wonder whether Casey also intended to ameliorate the agency’s vigorous
pursuit of powerful business interests.  In any event, matters did not work out
as envisioned.
Because of Watergate scandals at the Commission, the elevation of a for-
mer enforcement chief, Irving M. Pollack, to the Commission, and the strong
and creative leadership of the Division of Enforcement for many years by
Stanley Sporkin, the Enforcement Division dominated the Commission and to
a significant extent set its agenda.  As Chairman, Harold M. Williams gave the
office of General Counsel a role in analyzing recommendations of the Division
of Enforcement, but this generally led only to combat at the staff level rather
than the development of fresh policies at the Commission level.  Sometimes,
however, this more assertive role of the General Counsel did effect a significant
change in the Commission’s prosecutorial posture.36
As a Commissioner, I was very concerned about the development of securi-
ties law, and opposed to both substantive and procedural jurisdictional expan-
sionism through enforcement prosecutions.  The United States Supreme Court
had become highly critical of the SEC because of its efforts to expand its juris-
dictional reach and I believed that the Court’s new view of the securities laws
merited obeisance and not resistance.  Frequently, however, I was a dissenting
voice and vote on such issues.37
What duty did the SEC prosecutors owe to me, as one Commissioner out of
five who often disagreed with other Commissioners?  If their duty was to the
agency, as represented by the Commissioners, how did that duty play out when
the Commission was divided?  Commissions, like boards of directors, generally
act by consensus.  But political and personal policy differences may make con-
sensus difficult.  When the Commission is philosophically divided, the staff has
three choices:  It can delay decisionmaking; it can look to the chairman for
guidance; or it can make policy on its own, formulating its own view of the
public interest.  Because the staff has a permanence that the Commission lacks,
the third choice occurs more frequently than may be acknowledged.
In the prosecutorial function at the SEC, enforcement attorneys are the ac-
tivists.  They investigate suspicious facts and present cases to the Commission.
Although the Commission must authorize any formal investigation, prosecu-
tion, or settlement, the staff controls the factual record which is presented to
the Commission.38  It is psychologically and politically difficult to decline to in-
stitute a case involving bad facts or to accept a questionable settlement.  A
                                                          
36. For example, in Lasker v. Burks, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the SEC’s amicus curiae brief did not
simply argue for affirmance of the Second Circuit decision, but took a more conservative posture,
which was then adopted by the Supreme Court.
37. For a list of my dissents, see ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION—THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA app. C (1982).
38. This is why I insisted on reviewing a Wells Submission, setting forth a proposed defendant’s
view of the facts and law, before voting in favor of any prosecution when I was a Commissioner.  See
id. at 222-26.
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prosecutor’s view of justice or public policy may, indeed probably will, be dif-
ferent from that of a Commissioner.  Commissioners tend to be more moder-
ate, perhaps because they are appointed as part of a political process, and per-
haps because they have responsibilities for a wide variety of regulatory policies,
not only litigation policy.  An abstract principle that states that an agency at-
torney owes an ethical duty to the agency is not much help in resolving serious
and sincere differences of opinion about novel cases.
As a Commissioner, I was particularly troubled by the frequent use of set-
tlements to announce Commission policy in borderline cases.  Many of my dis-
sents involved the use of Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act39 to settle cases
which, in my view, would not have succeeded in the courts.40  It is in this context
that I wonder whether a prosecutor’s obligation to bring a case only if there is
probable cause applies to the use of leverage by the SEC to settle novel cases.
Although settlements often are motivated by uncertainty about legal outcome,
in my view, an SEC prosecutor should have a good faith belief that the courts
would uphold the legal theory utilized and the Commission should not accept a
settlement based on a theory it does not reasonably believe the courts would
uphold.
Sometimes the Commission is better able to appreciate the policy implica-
tions of a particular enforcement case after it has been authorized and tried.
On rare occasions, the Commission, when acting in its judicial role, will reject
theories that it put forth in its prosecutorial role.41  Such a reversal after the
facts and legal theories have been vetted may make for better development of
the law, but is it fair to the respondents whose careers have been adversely af-
fected during this process?
I am not faulting enforcement attorneys for pushing cases that are novel.
To the extent this is troublesome, it is a problem that is endemic to the adminis-
trative agency that combines prosecutorial, lawmaking, and adjudicatory func-
tions.  Furthermore, the inherent problems of a combination of functions have
been exacerbated by the numerous constraints put on the regulatory process in
recent years by Congress and the courts.  These constraints increase the incen-
tives on agencies like the SEC to develop new standards through enforcement
cases rather than through rulemaking proceedings.  However, where an investi-
gation is complete, it is very difficult for the Commission to decline to institute
a case involving bad facts or bad actors solely on the ground that the Supreme
                                                          
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1994).
40. When I was a Commissioner, I filed a dissent to the practice of using settlements to announce
new law. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15664 (March 21, 1979).  A case disposed of in this
fashion on that same day, In the Matter of Robert K. Lifton, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15665
(Mar. 21, 1979), involved insider trading conduct that the Supreme Court subsequently held not to be a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions.  See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  Yet, many
years later, the Court retreated from Chiarella in United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
Further, in 1990, Congress gave the SEC authority to bring cease-and-desist actions, which was what
the SEC was really doing in its use of Section 21(a) publicity as a sanction.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1,
78u-3 (1994).
41. See, e.g., In re George C. Kern, Jr., 50 S.E.C. 596 (1991).
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Court might not agree with the legal theory upon which the case is based.
Therefore the Enforcement Division is often in the position to create new law
when it is the Commissioners who should be doing so.
In addition, three avenues of communication utilized by SEC prosecutors
may sometimes enable them to by-pass the Commission and take the initiative
in the law creation process: lines to members of the financial press, relation-
ships with congressional staff members or key members of the Congress, and
direct communications with U.S. Attorneys’ offices.  A story about a financial
scandal can, as a practical matter, create a climate where prosecution against a
particular person or practice is no longer a Commission decision.  The pres-
sures to bring a case become too strong.  Whether the story is leaked by an
SEC staffer, a Congressional staffer, or an Assistant U.S. Attorney, or discov-
ered by an enterprising reporter, is irrelevant.  The SEC Enforcement Division
has almost always enjoyed very good press.  While this may be deserved for the
most part, it is not an accident.  Press relations are carefully cultivated.
Dealing with congressional staffers is a different kind of problem.  At least
while I was a Commissioner, the SEC did not consider itself as independent of
Congress as it did of the White House.  Perhaps this was a Watergate legacy,
but it seemed to be more fundamental.  Members of Congress who head up
oversight committees can cause an agency like the SEC a great deal of aggrava-
tion or can benefit the agency through budgetary largess or friendly statutory
amendments.  Furthermore, SEC Commissioners frequently have come from
the oversight committees, especially the Senate Banking Committee.  There
generally are cordial relations between the SEC staff and the congressional
staffs.  While the Enforcement Division probably would not quash an investiga-
tion because of congressional pressure, the staff can and does begin and pursue
investigations because of it.
Because the securities laws specifically authorize the Commission to trans-
mit evidence acquired in its investigations to the Attorney General for prosecu-
tion, relations with U.S. Attorneys’ offices are different from relations with
Congress.42  When I was a staff enforcement attorney in the 1960s, formal
criminal reference documents were prepared and authorized by the Commis-
sion for transmittal to the Department of Justice.  By the time I was a Commis-
sioner, the Commission did not review the facts or the legal theories upon
which a criminal reference was based.  Rather, the Commission authorized ac-
cess to investigatory files by the Department of Justice.  Whatever conversa-
tions then ensued between representatives of the Enforcement Division and
representatives of U.S. Attorney’s offices were not supervised by or reported to
the Commission.
Some of the adverse effects of this abdication by the Commission of its re-
sponsibility for shaping the securities laws later became apparent.  Restrictive
court interpretations of the securities laws, especially in criminal cases, threat-
                                                          
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(h)(9)(B) (1994).
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ened important enforcement programs.43  During the 1980s, when Rudolph Gi-
uliani was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, many high-
profile insider trading cases were prosecuted on unsettled theories of law.44
Moreover, the highly publicized and notorious arrests of three Wall Street in-
vestment bankers who were handcuffed in their offices but then refused to plea
bargain or plead guilty to insider trading charges resulted in the dismissal of
these charges as to two of the defendants years later.45
The cozy relationships between enforcement attorneys and influential out-
side forces like the financial press, Capitol Hill, and the Department of Justice
can give the prosecutors more power than Commissioners have, especially in
deciding legal policy issues.  The ethical and legal questions involved in such a
situation have rarely been examined.  One issue of legal ethics involved is that
attorneys have a duty to keep client confidences.  If the client is the agency as
represented by the Commissioners, should any enforcement attorney be dis-
cussing enforcement cases with anyone outside the agency?46  It is difficult and
unrealistic for Commissioners to prohibit communications between enforce-
ment attorneys and Congress or criminal prosecutors.  Calls from the press are
difficult for enforcement attorneys to ignore.  Prosecutors who are ambitious
and persuaded of the righteousness of their cause seek publicity and favorable
public opinion, especially when up against business interests they regard as
powerful.
IV
CONCLUSION
This essay has examined the role and ethics of the SEC enforcement attor-
ney in developing and prosecuting novel cases and the tensions between the
prosecutors and the Commission that arise in this process.  The essay has drawn
to a large extent on my own experiences in government and so its inquiries and
conclusions may be more subjective than the typical scholarly article.  If my
government service had occurred during different periods of the Commission’s
history, perhaps my outlook would be different.  But I believe that my concerns
                                                          
43. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d
364 (2d Cir. 1991).
44. The law remained unsettled on these points until about a decade later, when United States v.
O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), was decided.  See supra notes 6-7.
45. See Steve Schwartz & James B. Stewart, Justice Delayed—Kidder’s Mr. Wigton, Charged as
“Insider,” Ends His Long Ordeal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1989, at A1.  The third defendant eventually
pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud and consented to an injunction against him.  See SEC Lit.
Rel. No. 13663 (June 7, 1993).
46. Although government lawyers have a duty of confidentiality, this duty is more limited than the
duty of a private practitioner because a government lawyer’s duty does not extend to materials the
government is required to make public or has otherwise made public.  See Cramton, supra note 19, at
294.  Further, it is unclear whether the client in this context is only the agency but may include gov-
ernment officials above the agency level.  See id. at 303-05.  In the case of ongoing enforcement inves-
tigations at the SEC, confidentiality is protected by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994), and the Sunshine Act, codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 39 U.S.C., and therefore
confidentiality would seem to be required.
KARMEL.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  8:37 AM
Page 33: Winter 1998] SEC LAWYERS 45
about prosecutorial power and the need for that power to be constrained by the
commissioners who are accountable politically for policy making are not
merely the result of problems that I grappled with personally.
The combination of functions in administrative agencies has always been
constitutionally suspect, and yet government could not function effectively
without such agencies.  The constraints put on the agencies since Watergate to
make them more accountable and more conscious of the costs as well as the
benefits of regulation have frequently led to regulatory ossification.  The power
of special interests and agency capture also have made creating policy in the
public interest difficult. From the government’s perspective, one way to cut
through red tape is to create policy through enforcement actions.  Thus far, the
courts have not generally interfered with this method of action or an agency’s
choice of remedies or sanctions,47 nor have the courts sufficiently focused on
the issue of whether civil cases can fill in the contours of a vague statutory pro-
vision, allowing this enlarged view of a regulatory violation to serve as a predi-
cate for a criminal prosecution.48
The case-by-case development of regulatory law and policy produces many
problems, especially when the policy involves law enforcement actions against
regulated persons and businesses that have serious adverse consequences.  The
SEC is an independent agency that represents itself in the lower courts and can
bring a wide variety of enforcement actions, including cease-and-desist cases,
without even going to court.  Enforcement attorneys can assist and encourage
U.S. Attorneys to bring criminal cases.  The Commission has considerable lati-
tude in choosing its enforcement targets and theories.  The Commission there-
fore has a serious obligation to restrain the enforcement staff from overzealous
prosecutions.  Generally, the Commission takes this obligation seriously, but
political and time constraints sometimes permit the prosecutors to create the
law.
Failure by the SEC to supervise the enforcement staff adequately from time
to time may be due to a more general failure to curb prosecutorial excesses in
our political culture.  The unhealthy relationship between the media and prose-
cutors in many government quarters leads to selective leaking of information
about investigations and cases and to sensationalism.  Exciting and novel cases
satisfy prosecutorial ambitions and titillate the public.  Prosecutors become ce-
lebrities and go on to be mayors, governors, and judges.  Stanley Sporkin and
other heads of the SEC’s Enforcement Division seemed to receive more pub-
licity and were better known than many of the Commissioners who served at
the same time they did.
Development of the law should not be a public spectacle.  It is a serious
business that needs to be thoughtful and deliberative in order to command re-
spect.  Undisciplined prosecutions trivialize the law and encourage disregard
                                                          
47. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244
(1967); American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946).
48. But see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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for regulation by persons subject to a regulatory scheme and contempt for gov-
ernment by the general public.
